In the period following Spain's grant of local autonomy to Equatorial Guinea in 1963, there was a great deal of political party activity. Bubi and Fernandino parties on the island preferred separation from Rio Muni or a loose federation. Ethnically based parties in Rio Muni favored independence for a united country comprising Bioko and Rio Muni, an approach that ultimately won out. (The Movimiento para la Auto-determinacion de la Isla de Bioko (MAIB) which advocates independence for the island under Bubi control, is one of the offshoots of the era immediately preceding independence). After the accession of Macias to power, political activity largely ceased in Equatorial Guinea. Opposition figures who lived among the exile communities in Spain and elsewhere agitated for reforms; some of them had been employed in the Macias and Obiang governments. After political activities in Equatorial Guinea were legalized in the early 1990s, some opposition leaders returned to test the waters, but repressive actions have continued sporadically.

With the prodding of the United Nations, the United States, Spain, and other donor countries, the government undertook an electoral census in 1995. Freely contested municipal elections, the country's first, were held in September. Most observers agree that the elections themselves were relatively free and transparent and that the opposition parties garnered between two-thirds and three-quarters of the total vote. The government, however, delayed announcement of the results and then claimed a highly dubious 52% victory overall and the capture of 19 of 27 municipal councils. Ironically, Malabo's council went to the opposition. In early January 1996 Obiang called presidential elections to be held in 6 weeks. The campaign was marred by allegations of fraud, and most of the other candidates withdrew in the final week. Obiang claimed re-election with 98% of the vote. International observers agreed the election was not free or fair. In an attempt to ameliorate his critics, Obiang announced his new cabinet, giving minor portfolios to some people identified by the government as being opposition figures.

In the legislative election in March 1999, the party increased its majority in the 80-seat parliament from 68 to 75. The main opposition parties, the Convergencia para la democracia Social (CPDS) and the Union Popular (UP) supposedly won four seats and one seat, respectively, in Parliament; they refused to accept them. Local elections in May 2000 saw the PDGE overwhelm its rivals once again, winning a clean sweep of all major municipalities. However, the main opposition parties rejected the elections as invalid and boycotted them in December 2002.

The December 2002 presidential was marred by problems similar to those of the elections of the 1990s. Capitalizing on opposition disorganization, Obiang re-scheduled the elections from 2003 to the end of 2002. Obiang was re-elected as president with an overwhelming 97 percent of the vote in a poll characterized by mismanagement, irregularities and severe limits on opposition campaign activities. Following his re-election Obiang formed a government of national unity encompassing all opposition parties, except for the CPDS, which declined to join after Obiang refused to release one of their jailed leaders.

Since independence, the two Presidents (Macias and his nephew Obiang) have been the dominant political forces. Since 1979, President Obiang has been constrained only by a need to maintain a consensus among his advisers and political supporters, most of whom are drawn from the Nguema family in Mongomo, in the eastern part of Rio Muni. The Nguema family is part of the Esangui subclan of the Fang. Alleged coup attempts in 1981 and 1983 raised little sympathy among the populace.

President Obiang's rule, in which schools were permitted to reopen and primary education expanded, and public utilities and roads restored, compares favorably with Macias' tyranny and terror. It has been criticized for not implementing genuine democratic reforms. Corruption and a dysfunctional judicial system disrupt the development of Equatorial Guinea's economy and society. In March 2001 the President appointed a new Prime Minister, Candido Muatetema Rivas, and replaced several ministers perceived to be especially corrupt. However, the government budget still does not include all revenues and expenditures. The United Nations Development Program has proposed a broad governance reform program, but the Equato Guinean Government was not moving rapidly to implement it.

Equatorial Guinea suffered a severe human rights setback in May 2002 when a special tribunal convicted 68 prisoners and their relatives and sentenced them from 6 to 20 years in prison for a purported coup d'etat plot attempt against President Obiang. Those sentenced included leaders of the three main opposition parties that remained independent from President Obiang's ruling party. There were numerous irregularities associated with the trial, including evidence of torture and a lack of substantive proof. In August 2003, 31 of these convicted prisoners were granted a presidential amnesty on the anniversary of Obiang's 1979 overthrow of his uncle, President Macias.

Although Equatorial Guinea lacks a well-established democratic tradition comparable to the developed democracies of the West, it should be noted that, out of the anarchic, chaotic, and repressive conditions of the Macias years the country has made small, haphazard steps toward the development of participatory political system.